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Abstract 
Purpose – To analyze the controversy about the allocation of critical Internet resources 
generated by ICANN's new gTLD program with a particular focus on the .AMAZON 
TLD. 
Methodology/approach/design – This article presents an exploratory case study about 
the .AMAZON controversy. The initial analysis of this ongoing research is based on data 
collected from various reports and media coverage on ICANN's new gTLD policy. The 
article draws from political economy theory to analyze disputes about critical Internet 
resources. 
Findings – This article discusses preliminary findings of the .AMAZON case, a contested 
prime example in ICANN's efforts to extend the Internet's domain name space. 
Practical implications – The findings may inform related controversies in the gTLD 
program and contribute to a differentiated understanding of CIR allocation in Internet 
governance, and respective policy-making. 
Originality/value – The value of this article is the specific discussion of the .AMAZON 
case in the larger context of ICANN's new gTLD program, and its analysis that describes 
the controversy from a property rights perspective.  
 
Keywords: ICANN, gTLD, Amazon.com, .AMAZON, Critical Internet Resources (CIR), 
Internet governance, property rights. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Contentions about critical Internet resources (CIR) have been major 
forces in the formation and institutionalization of Internet governance. The 
Internet governance regime has evolved from these still ongoing debates and has 
received much attention in scholarly studies. As Mueller (2010) points out, 
Internet name and number resources represent a very important element within 
the technical Internet infrastructure over which governments have only limited 
control. 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is 
a private non-profit organization, and has been under contract with the U.S. 
Department of Commerce to oversee and administer the Internet Assigned 
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Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, including the management of the Domain 
Name System (DNS) (Mathiason, 2009; Raja, 2013). ICANN operates at the top 
of the DNS hierarchy, the “root zone” (Zhu, 2012). Those unique names and 
numbers associated with the root zone, including domain names, IP addresses, 
and AS numbers, are referred to as critical Internet resources (e.g., IGF, 2010; 
Mueller, 2010). The new generic Top-Level Domain (gTLD) program, which 
provides the context for this article, is a recent ICANN program that will lead to 
major changes in the Internet's address space and affect the allocation of critical 
Internet resources. 
The program has raised a new round of debates on the allocation of 
Internet top-level domain names, such as .WINE and .BOOK, and has led to 
numerous filed objections against some applications in which various third 
parties saw their interests or material rights threatened or violated. This article 
addresses the political economy of critical Internet resources, particularly in 
regard to the creation of new gTLDs and the controversy that followed. For this 
purpose, we focus on the .AMAZON case, which received considerable 
attention. The U.S. Internet retail giant Amazon.com, Inc. filed an application 
for the new gTLD .AMAZON. This application has been disputed in a concerted 
effort by multiple South American governments who have territorial interests in 
the Amazon region. At the core of this controversy is a clash of interests 
between a private U.S. corporation to assert the brand that it built and has used 
over the last 19 years, and the governments of multiple South American nation-
states, representing the interests of the South American people to preserve a 
name that reinforces the preservation of the Amazon region, and which has been 
used for the last 500 years (De Carbaxal, 1501). 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the controversy over the 
.AMAZON gTLD. The article draws from earlier work in Internet governance 
that applied political economy theory to examine the Internet's domain name 
space. It examines the .AMAZON case with regard to the implications of 
assigning a TLD to a private corporation with a particular focus on geographical 
names, and draws insights from this controversy on dispute mechanisms and 
dynamics. 
This article reports on an ongoing research effort to study the .AMAZON 
case; as such the analysis and findings stated here should be considered as 
preliminary. The analysis is based on data collected from GAC reports, ICANN 
policy reports, news articles, and relevant policy websites, and blogs, covering 
ICANN's new gTLD policy. 
The structure of the article is as follows: It first introduces some key 
Internet governance entities and concepts to set the stage for discussing the new 
gTLD program and the .AMAZON case. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
political economy as a theoretical lens to examine resource allocation in Internet 
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governance. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the new gTLD program and provide an 
analytical narrative of the .AMAZON controversy. The article ends with 
concluding thoughts. 
 
1. BACKGROUND 
This section presents an overview of ICANN's role as the administrator 
of the DNS root zone, and short descriptions of relevant entities and terms. It 
further includes a brief outline of ICANN's mechanisms for solving legal 
disputes related to domain names. 
 
ICANN and the GAC 
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 
was created in 1998 as a private non-profit organization under the laws of the 
State of California (Take, 2012). Its multi-stakeholder governance model 
involves governments, the private sector, and civil society. As a matter of fact, 
the creation of ICANN was the result of negotiations between different 
stakeholders, including the technical community, U.S. government agencies, 
intellectual property rights holders, and private sector corporations (Mathiason, 
2009). 
As stipulated in its bylaws, ICANN's board of directors has no 
representation of national governments or intergovernmental entities. The 
Government Advisory Committee (GAC), representing governments and a few 
international governmental organizations, can advise ICANN's board of 
directors on public policy issues. Its advice, however, is nonbinding (ICANN, 
2013a). Even though the board of directors is the highest authority, governments 
have the opportunity to influence ICANN's decision-making through the GAC, 
but only if ICANN's board of directors seeks comments from the GAC on a 
particular policy issue. The GAC only acts in matters where ICANN's policies, 
laws, and international agreements need to be “harmonized” or when ICANN's 
policies may affect public policy issues (Take, 2012). 
Today, ICANN works as a global multi-stakeholder organization, whose 
function is to oversee a number of Internet-related functions, such as the domain 
name registration procedure (Raja, 2013). The IANA contract grants ICANN the 
authority to create policies to regulate the DNS root zone and keep track of the 
Top-Level Domains (TLD), the subordinate level of name space within the root 
(Zhu, 2012). In this condition, ICANN was charged by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce to address the problem of the scarcity of domain names since domain 
names are limited, contrary to popular believes (Mathiason, 2009). 
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Critical Internet Resources (CIR) 
ICANN operates at the top of the DNS hierarchy, the root zone 
(Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 2002) which is a key area for Internet governance 
and critical Internet resources (CIR) (IGF, 2010). During the 2007 Internet 
Governance Forum in Rio de Janeiro, the term “critical Internet resources” 
dominated a significant part of the discussion. In the Internet policy realm, this 
term refers to the governance debate about ICANN's role and the administration 
of the Internet's naming and addressing domains (Huston, 2007). 
According to the Working Group of Internet Governance (WGIG), CIR 
refers to the: 
“… administration of the domain name system and Internet protocol 
addresses (IP addresses), administration of the root server system, technical 
standards, peering and interconnection, telecommunications infrastructure, 
including innovative and convergent technologies, as well as 
multilingualization. These issues are matters of direct relevance to Internet 
governance and fall within the ambit of existing organizations with 
responsibility for these matters.” (WGIG, 2005) 
In this scenario, the term “critical Internet resources” refers to specific 
issues, such as the “governance of Internet standards, domain names, and IP 
addresses, and to the interconnection and routing arrangements among Internet 
service providers” (Mueller, 2010, p. 215). As it can be inferred from the WGIG 
statement above, this is the reason why the role of ICANN has become so 
important: ICANN is the entity that controls these valuable resources. 
 
Domain Name System (DNS) 
The Internet is considered the biggest directory service, and in that way, 
each point in the network needs a name (Mathiason, 2009). In the Internet 
infrastructure, that name is called a “domain name”, and it is identified by a text-
based URL, known as a “host name”, such as www.syr.edu, to visit the website 
of Syracuse University in the United States (Mathiason, 2009; Mueller, 2002). 
Every domain name is associated with a number, an “Internet Protocol (IP) 
address”, and the whole picture is known as the “Domain Name System (DNS)”. 
The DNS is called an “association number”, it translates host names, such as 
www.syr.edu, into an IP addresses, such as 123.4567.891.011 (Wang, 2003). 
 
Top-Level Domains (TLDs) 
Multiple activities on the Internet, like email or the World Wide Web 
(www), use domain names instead of Internet Protocol (IP) numbers as 
addresses. When Internet packets flow across the network, the domain names are 
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translated into IP addresses. Both kinds of addresses – domain names and IP 
numbers – are valuable resources, “a kind of virtual real estate that can be 
bought and sold” (Mueller, 2002, p.6). 
Top-level domains (TLDs) are part of an Internet address; they (were 
originally intended to) tell Internet users what sort of site they are visiting, such 
as “.COM” for a commercial or business website (Lipton & Wong, 2012). By 
June 2012, there were about 250 country code top-level domains (ccTLDs), 
which represent the identity of each nation-state on the Internet, such as .CH (for 
Switzerland) and .PE (for Peru). There were also 21 generic top-level domains 
(gTLDs), such as .COM, .ORG, or .EDU. The only entity that can create new 
TLDs is ICANN. Only ICANN has the authority to make changes in the root 
zone.1 From a technical point of view, the root zone can be defined as the 
computer file that authorizes TLDs, but the root zone is more than that (Arthur, 
2012). As Mueller (2002) explains, the root zone is the point of centralization in 
the Internet's decentralized architecture and “stands at the top of the hierarchical 
distribution of responsibility that makes the Internet work”. It further represents 
the start point in a “long chain of contracts and cooperation” between Internet 
service providers and users who use theses addresses and names to surf the web 
and for data packets to arrive at their correct destinations (Mueller, 2002). 
 
Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy (UDRP) 
In 1999, ICANN created the Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy 
(UDRP) to address problems related to cybersquatting and protect intellectual 
property rights. According to the UDRP policy, a domain name held by a 
domainer2 will be transferred, deleted, or modified in the following 
circumstances (ICANN, 1999): 
 
1) The domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or 
service mark in which the complainant has rights. 
2) The domainer does not have rights or legitimate interests in respect of 
the domain name. 
3) The domain name in question has been registered and is being used in 
bad faith. 
                                                          
1The root zone is the most authoritative telephone directory for the Internet . If a top-level 
domain is not in the directory, it does not exist. 
2A domainer is a person or an entity that buys or sells domain names for the purpose of 
generating profits through speculation or advertising related to popular or sought -after 
domain names.  
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2. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DOMAIN NAMES 
The battle between South America and Amazon.com, Inc. for the 
.AMAZON gTLD can be described by using property rights, a common concept 
in political economy. For Gilpin (1987) the term ‘political economy’ is 
constructed through the parallel existence of and the interaction between the 
‘state’ and the ‘market’: 
“(…) almost all political economists assume that markets are embedded in 
larger sociopolitical structures that determine to a considerable extent the role 
and functioning of markets in social and political affairs and that the social, 
political, and cultural environment significantly influences the purpose of 
economic activities and determines the boundaries within which markets 
necessarily must function (Gilpin, 1987, p.74).” 
The modern definition of the term includes the relationship between 
economics and politics in nation-states and across different nation-states; 
depending upon the case, private and public institutions may be included 
(Timimi, 2010). As a theory, political economy focuses on the explanation of 
how political institutions, the political environment, and the economic system 
influence each other (e.g., Weingast & Wittman, 2008). This is important 
because the analysis of the interaction between political economy forces and the 
potential outcome can generate a set of policies to help policy makers find an 
equilibrium while addressing concrete problems (Hoekman & Kostecki, 2009). 
The academic literature covers a variety of meanings for the term 
‘political economy’. In this article, we refer to it as the application of an 
economic rationale to explain the contentions over the assignment and allocation 
of resources in the new gTLD program, which constitutes an extension of the 
domain name space. 
Mueller (2002) pioneered the use of political economy in Internet 
governance. In his book “Ruling the Root – Internet governance and taming of 
cyberspace”, he draws from institutional economic theory to analyze the 
institutionalization of Internet governance, which culminated in the formation of 
a new governance regime. The Internet's infrastructure is beyond the control of a 
single entity. Its ability to connect information and people all over the world 
transformed the political economy of communication and information (Mueller, 
2010). 
In a similar vein, Park (2008) analyzed the political economy of country 
code top-level domains (ccTLDs) using regime theory. In the Internet, “names 
and numbers” are scarce, valuable resources. While the Internet's domain space 
provides, in theory, superabundant combinations for names, in practice, it is a 
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particular instance of a name, such as www.syr.edu, that is a rivalrous and 
excludable resource. The development of Internet governance is closely 
intertwined with the battle over the appropriation of these resources and the 
institutionalization of norms, rules, and regimes to govern them (e.g., the 
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy to resolve trademark 
conflicts related to domain names). 
Property rights provide a tool to conceptualize the conflict over the 
allocation of resources, such as domain names. Mueller (2002, p. 60) defines 
property rights as rights that “… assign decision-making authority over 
resources to individuals or groups. They are defined by formal laws and 
regulations as well as by informal customs and norms that affect the way the 
formal specifications are put into practice”. Property rights provide the authority 
to use, sell or transfer a resource or allow others to use or exclude others from 
using it. In practice, however, property rights do not provide absolute control, 
but may be restricted, for instance, through contractual agreements. 
With regard to the new gTLD program as described in the following 
section, it extends the domain space and generates conflicts around competing 
applications, interests and objections. From a property rights perspective, 
acquiring a TLD under this program does not establish “ownership” over a 
particular gTLD. The agreement between ICANN and the registrar gives the 
latter the right to use the gTLD, but the property rights are limited (e.g., see 7.11 
‘Ownership Rights’ in draft for a new gTLD registry agreement (ICANN, 
2012a)). Further, the registrar is contractually bound not to transfer the TLD to 
others and needs to follow certain policies that restrict names and character 
strings used in domains (e.g., see 2.6 ‘Reserved Names’ in draft for a new gTLD 
registry agreement (ICANN, 2012a)). While the gTLD program builds upon 
existing regimes, the adaption of existing institutions to establish the gTLD 
program was significant and required considerable efforts. 
 
3. THE NEW gTLD PROGRAM 
The new generic top-level domain (gTLD) program was launched in June 
2011. However, preparatory steps for the new program, informed by previous 
experiences with introducing new TLDs, go back further. From 2005 to 2007 
ICANN's Generic Names Supporting Organization (GNSO) conducted a policy 
development process, assessing the creation of the new gTLD program. During 
its 32nd International Public Meeting, held in Paris in 2008, the ICANN board 
passed 19 policy recommendations concerning new gTLDs. The purpose of the 
new gTLD program is to extend the domain name space and to enhance 
competition, increase innovation, and widen the choice in Internet domain 
names (ICANN, 2013b). The domain name space has been extended in previous 
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years, to include top-level domains such as .AERO, .BIZ, .COOP, .INFO, 
.MUSEUM, .NAME, and .PRO in 2000; and .ASIA, .CAT, .JOBS, .MOBI, 
.POST, .TEL, .XXX, and .TRAVEL in 2004. These extensions were not free of 
controversies either. The .XXX gTLD, designating adult content, for instance, 
led to particular sharp debates about moral and content regulation, delaying 
approval and actual operation until spring 2011. Thus, it is not astonishing that 
experts foresaw that the new gTLD program would cause trademark issues and 
litigations (Schonfeld, 2011). 
ICANN has to evaluate the questions of when, how, and under what 
circumstances new gTLDs would be added, since only ICANN is responsible for 
this particular function under the current regime (Weinberg, 2002). The new 
gTLD program was open to anybody with sufficient financial means to file an 
application for a new gTLD from January to May 2012. At the beginning of the 
2012 expansion, ICANN declared that it was not possible to estimate how many 
applications would be received, but initial expectations from 2011 estimated 
between 300 and 1,000 new gTLDs (Warren, 2011). However, by June 13, 
2012, ICANN had received 1,930 gTLD applications, the most popular being 
.APP, .HOME, .INC, and .ART. (ICANN, 2012d; INTA, 2012). Out of the 
submissions received within the 2012 application window, 230 are directly 
contested strings with more than one applicant (e.g., .APP submitted by 13 
separate entities; .HOME, applied for by 11 different parties) (ICANN, 2012d). 
The gTLD .AMAZON was one of the applications that ICANN received. 
The resolution process proposed by ICANN to address multiple 
registrations for the same gTLD was through an auction mechanism. Applicants 
would resolve the conflict themselves, and the new gTLD would go to the 
highest bidder (Nazzaro, 2014; Warren, 2011). As of April 3, 2015, from the 
1,930 applications, 583 applications completed the gTLD registration, 482 were 
withdrawn, 65 were not approved and 800 were still being processed. (ICANN, 
2015).  
Registering a new gTLD comes with significantly high costs, and the 
commitment lasts for a ten-year period. The initial registration costs 
approximately USD 185,000 with an estimated cost, including operational costs 
and legal fees, over a one to two year time period of up to USD 2 million 
(Angeles, Bagley, Müller, Pinaire, & Vayra, 2010). Organizations that can 
afford the USD 185,000 registration fee and further costs will be able to register 
a new gTLD. Table 1 breaks down the various fees, payable to ICANN. 
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Fee Description 
Initial Registration Fee: USD 185,000 Per initial registration 
Fixed Fee: USD 6,250 Per calendar quarter 
Registry-Level Transaction Fee: USD 
0.25 
per domain name and year after 
50,000 domain names have been 
registered 
Source: instar CORPORATION, 2014 
Table 1 – gTLD Fees 
 
According to Esther Dyson, founding chairwoman of ICANN, the new 
ICANN program allows the creation of new domains for almost any word or 
brand someone wants to register. Successful registrants can use the whole new 
gTLD just for themselves in a closed model. Alternatively, they can open it up 
to others who can then register a domain under the new TLD. For Dyson, this is 
a “way for registries and registrars to make money” and recoup their costs 
(Schonfeld, 2011). 
 
Disputes, Legal Controversies, and Grounds for Objection 
If an applicant has the technical, financial, and operational capacity to 
become the operator of a new gTLD, then the applicant will be granted the 
registration for that new gTLD, consisting of a string of alpha-numeric 
characters (Lipton & Wong, 2012). The applicant then becomes the registrar, a 
single authority, who is responsible for keeping order in that portion of the 
Internet's domain name space, including solving controversies about ownership 
and making sure that sites are visible to the rest of the Internet users (Arthur, 
2012). However, after a new gTLD is approved and its management delegated to 
the registrar, it is unclear what kinds of rules should be adopted to ensure 
appropriate balancing of trademark rights and other interests within that newly 
created space (Mahler, 2014). 
According to Lipton and Wong (2012), empirical evidence shows that 
“the areas of dispute resolution in the existing domain space have involved: 1) 
disputes where free expression is heavily implicated (…); and 2) disputes that do 
not involve trademark interests”. Although in the past, ICANN tried to resolve 
these disputes in the domain space, some scholars argue that mechanisms 
implemented for that purpose, such as UDRP, are “too heavily weighted” in 
favor of protecting the interests of trademark holders. However, other important 
interests are not equally considered. Reasons for this high protection lie in “the 
power international trademark lobby wielded in the development process” 
(Lipton & Wong, 2012). 
ICANN has established a procedure to object gTLD applications. Table 2 
lists four grounds upon which an individual or entity may file a formal objection 
regarding a new gTLD application (ICANN, 2012a). 
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Objection Ground Description 
String Confusion Objection The applied-for gTLD string is 
confusingly similar to an existing TLD 
or to another applied-for gTLD string 
in the same round of applications. 
Legal Rights Objection The applied-for gTLD string infringes 
the existing legal rights of the objector. 
Limited Public Interest Objection 
(formerly the Morality and Public 
Order Objection) 
The applied-for gTLD string is 
contrary to generally accepted legal 
norms of morality and public order 
that are recognized under principles of 
international law. 
Community Objections There is substantial opposition to the 
gTLD application from a significant 
portion of the community to which the 
gTLD string may be explicitly or 
implicitly targeted. 
Source: instar CORPORATION, 2014 
Table 2 – Objection Grounds 
According to Mahler (2014), legal rights objections are most directly 
relevant to brand owners. We must remember, however, that in an international 
context and also in the Internet domain name space, there is no universal legal or 
economic definition of ‘property right’ across all legal systems. Although 
labeled as covering generic “legal rights”, ICANN's definition of the grounds for 
objection makes clear that protecting trademark rights is ICANN's central 
concern. This is the reason why conflicts within the new gTLD program exist. 
As currently implemented, the new program leans heavily toward protecting 
trademark over other interests. 
The legal rights objection procedure can be based on common law 
trademark rights. It involves an assessment of eight factors similar to the 
“Polaroid factors”3 (Raja, 2013). Objectors and respondents base their pleadings 
on Module 3 of ICANN's Applicant Guidebook, and they have objections 
resolved by a panel of one to three experts appointed by the United Nations' 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (Stanford, 2013). 
 
                                                          
3When determining the likelihood of confusion over a trademark, courts apply the 
“Polaroid Factors”; these are used as guidelines, but not all factors may be considered in a 
given case. The factors are derived from and named after the 1961 case Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polarad Elecs. Corp. 
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Critiques to the ICANN policy and the gTLD program 
The new gTLD program has led to considerable disputes within ICANN's 
multistakeholder community. Major actors and their positions against the 
program include: (Froomkin, 2011): 
 
1.Intellectual property rights-holders, who are concerned that the new 
gTLDs will increase trademark infringement opportunities and 
monitoring costs. 
2.Governments, which argue about the semantic content of potential new 
gTLDs on public order grounds. 
3.Non-governmental actors, who expressed technical or aesthetic 
objections to the program itself. 
ICANN was criticized by some stakeholders for “policy mistakes” within 
the new program. Main issues included: 
 
1. Allowing new gTLDs to be run as a “closed registry”: 
This means that one company, the applicant and registrar in this case (if 
the gTLD is granted) keeps the benefit of using the gTLD on a closed 
basis for its own and sole benefit. This means that, for instance, if Google 
is granted the TLDs .EARTH, or .CAR, no one other than Google is 
entitled to register domains, such as SOMETHING.EARTH or 
SOMETHING.CAR (Alleman, 2014b). 
On this matter, it is important to remember the provisions of ICANN's 
Applicant Guidebook which states that the “beneficiary to whom the new 
gTLD is reserved is the only one permitted to exploit, or to authorize 
others to exploit, worldwide the domain names associated with the 
applicants suffix consisting of this gTLD” (Passa, 2014, p.1). 
 
2. ICANN did not limit the number of applications per company: 
Part of the civil society showed concerns because ICANN did not limit 
the number of applications per company. Reasons for this lie in the fact 
that one company and its partners would be able to apply, and eventually 
control, a substantial part of the market (Berkens, 2012). 
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3. Unclear ICANN policy on similar strings: 
One of the main problems is that if a similar string for a new gTLD is 
chosen by multiple applicants, this may lead to confusion. On this matter, 
ICANN's Applicant Guidebook established a string contention procedure 
(ICANN, 2012a): 
“Module 4 - String Contention Procedures 
 
This module describes situations in which contention over applied-
for gTLD strings occurs, and the methods available to applicants for 
resolving such contention cases. 
 
4.1 String Contention 
String contention occurs when either: 
 
1. Two or more applicants for an identical gTLD string successfully 
complete all previous stages of the evaluation and dispute resolution 
processes; or 
 
2. Two or more applicants for similar gTLD strings successfully 
complete all previous stages of the evaluation and dispute resolution 
processes, and the similarity of the strings is identified as creating a 
probability of user confusion if more than one of the strings is 
delegated. 
 
ICANN will not approve applications for proposed gTLD strings that 
are identical or that would result in user confusion, called contending 
strings. (…)” 
 
To resolve the matter of string contention, ICANN applies an algorithm 
to compare gTLD strings in order to test for “similarity”. Eventually, 
however, human judgment will make the final call (Berkens, 2012). For 
instance, how confusing can .NGO, .NG (Nigeria's ccTLD), and .NO 
(Norway's ccTLD) be? The critics of the program argue that ICANN 
lacks detailed standards for the examiners to decide about confusingly 
similar strings (Berkens, 2012).  
 
4. THE .AMAZON CONTROVERSY 
In early 2012, the private company Amazon EU S.à r.l. applied for 76 
top-level domains, and the cost of those applications was around USD 14 
million. Among the applications, there were 11 internationalized domain names, 
which include brand-related terms like .AUDIBLE, .KINDLE, and the 
controversial .AMAZON. Other applications include generic terms, such as 
.WOW, .GAME, .FREE, .LIKE, .SHOP, and .MAIL. In the case of .AMAZON, 
the company's purpose was to exclusively use the top-level domain for its 
various online services (Watts, 2013). According to the registration rules, the 
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board of ICANN should evaluate the multiple requests of Amazon EU S.à r.l. 
and grant or deny the registration (ICANN, 2012c). According to the applicant 
guidebook, a company can reserve its own name, its trademark, or one of its 
trademarks as a new gTLD. On this subject, geographical names and purely 
generic product or service names can also be reserved (Passa, 2014). Despite the 
gTLD rules, observers argued that if Amazon EU S.à r.l. succeeds with its 
registration, the world of Internet commerce would be significantly reshaped 
(Nazzaro, 2014). 
With similar intentions, Google applied for 101 gTLDs, including 23 
strings similar to Amazon's applications, a situation that led to a direct conflict 
between these two large Internet corporations (Nazzaro, 2014; Sloan, 2012). At 
the same time, a group of businesses and organizations, such as Nokia, 
Microsoft, Oracle, Expedia, TripAdvisor, Hotwire, and Kayak, lobbied against 
Google's and Amazon's gTLD applications (Alleman, 2014b). 
As established by the applicant guidebook, the registry operator of a new 
string (the beneficiary of a new gTLD reservation) is legally entitled to run a 
gTLD as a “closed registry”. The registry operator has two options: 1) to keep 
the new gTLD for its own use, or 2) to open its gTLD and allow third parties to 
reserve domain names associated with this string, which are known as second-
level registrations in this gTLD. In the second case, the applicant becomes the 
registrar of these third-party domain names and is entitled to set its naming 
conventions and create the conditions under which third parties can reserve these 
domain names (Passa, 2014). In the specific case of .AMAZON, Amazon EU 
S.à. r.l. chose the first option and decided to keep a closed registry policy 
(Alleman, 2014a). The company did not plan to offer any second-level domain 
registrations to the public. That is, for every gTLD Amazon is awarded, only 
this company and its partners could register domains, such as 
SOMETHING.AMAZON or SOMETHING.KINDLE (Alleman, 2014a, 2014b). 
After the .AMAZON filing took place, the governments of eight South 
American nation-states, led by Brazil and Peru4, which share sovereignty over 
the geographical Amazon region, raised objections to the .AMAZON gTLD 
application (RPP, 2013). It is crucial to understand that the South American 
governments are not claiming a .AMAZON gTLD in any form. They claim that 
the words “Amazon”, “Amazonas”, “Amazonia”, and “Amazonía” (with accent 
mark) and their variants refer to a geographic region that covers several nation-
states in South America. Peru's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Miguel 
Palomino, stated that the South American governments do not question the 
                                                          
4Several Latin American nation-states protested against the Amazon EU S.à r.l. 
application, including Brazil and Peru. The Amazon River flows through the territories of 
those two nation-states, and it covers 2/3 of the river's 5.5 million km2 plain, known as 
Amazonia (Passa, 2014). 
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brand, but he pointed out that “a geographic name that is the heritage of the 
Amazonian countries cannot be an object of an Internet domain” (Mitnick, 
2013).  
The main concern of South American governments is based on the fact 
that where a name or cultural indicator is protected as a trademark, the holder of 
the rights in the market could take full advantage of all of the protections 
granted by the trademark-focused domain name regulations (Lipton & Wong, 
2012). As a result, the shared perspective of the South American governments is 
that the U.S. Internet retail company should not obtain, appropriate, or 
commercialize the .AMAZON gTLD. The South American governments base 
their objections on the need to protect and create awareness about one of the 
largest bio-systems on the planet (Watts, 2013). 
On December 17, 2012, Amazon EU S.à. r.l. communicated to the 
Brazilian and Peruvian governments that the company was not going to 
withdraw its application for the new .AMAZON TLD (RPP, 2013). Shortly 
before that, the Latin American governments tried to change the company's 
mind. They used a procedure known as “early warning” to present an objection 
to ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) (ICANN, 2012b). The 
GAC advises ICANN, but its conclusions are not binding (ICANN, 2013a). In 
its advisory opinion, the GAC favored the South American governments' 
position and advised against the registration of .AMAZON (ICANN, 2012b). 
The early warning recommends that the applicant withdraw its 
application because the string also refers to an important region of South 
America, part of the sovereign space of eight nation-states and also coincides 
with the name of an international organization, the “Amazon Cooperation Treaty 
Organization”, from which many of these nation-states are members (ICANN, 
2013c). 
The GAC members Brazil and Peru provided the following rationales in 
the early warning: 
“The Amazon region constitutes an important part of the territory of 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname and Venezuela, 
due to its extensive biodiversity and incalculable natural resources. Granting 
exclusive rights to this specific gTLD to a private company would prevent the 
use of this domain for purposes of public interest related to the protection, 
promotion and awareness rising on issues related to the Amazon biome. It 
would also hinder the possibility of use of this domain to congregate web 
pages related to the population inhabiting that geographical region.” (ICANN, 
2012b) 
Observers speculated that the U.S. government may lobby in favor of 
Amazon EU S.à. r.l. (Mitnick, 2013). As a matter of fact, initially, the U.S. 
government opposed the GAC objection to geographic strings, such as 
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.AMAZON. However, on July 5, 2013, the National Telecommunications & 
Information Administration (NTIA), the U.S. government's representative to the 
GAC, announced that the U.S. government would remain neutral in 
controversies related to specific geographic strings, such as .SHENZEN (IDN in 
Chinese), .PERSIANGULF,.GUANGZHOU (IDN in Chinese), .AMAZON (and 
IDNs in Japanese and Chinese), .PATAGONIA, .YUN, and .THAI (NTIA, 
2013). Nevertheless, the U.S. government position was that “sovereignty” is not 
a valid argument for objecting to the use of terms because there is no 
“international consensus that recognizes inherent governmental rights in 
geographic terms” (NTIA, 2013). Finally, the U.S. government clarified that its 
position in reference to these specific gTLD applications “does not prejudice 
future United States positions within the ICANN model or beyond” (NTIA, 
2013). 
After the U.S. government declared itself neutral, the GAC presented a 
consensus objection regarding the .AMAZON string and all its internationalized 
domain names in various scripts (Murphy, 2013). From that moment, the 
controversy was limited to two positions: 
“whether the rules and principles cited in support of these objections and 
reiterated in the unfavourable advice issued by the GAC are of such nature as 
to oblige ICANN to reject the application filed by Amazon (A) or, to the 
contrary, whether the rules and principles cited by Amazon in its response of 
23 August 2013 to the GAC's advice oblige it to reserve the new gTLD 
‘.amazon’ (B) (Passa, 2014, p.3)”. 
The legal issue to resolve was whether a geographical name not 
recognized by any statute or by registration should have some level of legal 
protection, when the products from the geographical area in question are known 
to have special characteristics or qualities. Facing this problem, at the beginning 
of 2014, ICANN commissioned an independent, third party expert to provide 
additional advice on the specific legal issues, focusing on legal norms or treaty 
conventions with regards to the .AMAZON case (ICANN, 2014b). In March 
2014, during its Singapore meeting, the GAC encouraged ICANN's board to 
make a decision about this subject because of the long time that had passed since 
the early warning was issued (ICANN, 2014a). 
By May 2014, ICANN rejected the .AMAZON application, including the 
Chinese and Japanese translation of the name: 
“Resolved (2014.05.14.NG03), the NGPC accepts the GAC advice 
identified in the GAC Register of Advice as 2013-07-18-Obj-Amazon, and 
directs the President and CEO, or his designee, that the applications for 
.AMAZON (application number 1-1315-58086) and related IDNs in Japanese 
(application number 1-1318-83995) and Chinese (application number 1-1318-
5581) filed by Amazon EU S.à r.l. should not proceed. By adopting the GAC 
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advice, the NGPC notes that the decision is without prejudice to the 
continuing efforts by Amazon EU S.à r.l. and members of the GAC to pursue 
dialogue on the relevant issues. (As cited by Murphy, 2014, para.4)” 
(Griswold, 2014) 
The three applications, in English, Chinese, and Japanese, to register the 
gTLD .AMAZON would remain “frozen” until Amazon.com, Inc. withdraws 
them (Murphy, 2014) or until it manages to break the arbitration agreement and 
find a way to appeal ICANN's decision. The timeline in figure 1 summarizes 
major events of the .AMAZON controversy. 
 
Figure 1 – Timeline new gTLD program and the .AMAZON controversy 
 
5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The gTLD program, conceptualized as an extension of the existing 
namespace within the Domain Name System, can be analyzed from a property 
rights perspective, including the conflicts that arose from competing applications 
for a particular gTLD. From an economic perspective, applicants likely consider 
the gTLD as a significant investment in an Internet-related asset. An application 
for a gTLD is very costly, but if successful, the gTLD will offer a potentially 
valuable advantage to private companies who are willing to invest in the 
visibility of their brand names. The gTLD provides them with property rights 
the registrar did not have before. Although there is not a universal understanding 
of the concept of property rights, it helps to solve conflicts over the allocation of 
‘names and numbers’ in the Internet namespace. Property rights provide an 
individual or groups the authority over an asset. However, the control over the 
property rights also has limits. In the particular case of the new gTLD program, 
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it does not establish ‘ownership’ over a particular gTLD. As mentioned above, 
the contractual relationship between ICANN and the registrar is not legally clear 
(Mahler, 2014). The gTLD agreement gives the registrar the right to use the 
gTLD, but at the same time requires the registrar to fulfill ICANN's technical 
and legal requirements (ICANN, 2014c). It makes clear that the registrar does 
not have the capacity to dispose of the gTLD as a property owner could. 
The .AMAZON case reveals that the U.S. online retailer's commercial 
interests in the gTLD are further grounded in an increased level of brand 
protection. The South American governments, on the other hand, do not want to 
have .AMAZON registered or even used for any kind of purposes. Their interest 
is to keep a .AMAZON gTLD non-existent. The analysis of the .AMAZON 
controversy provides insights into how the processes around the new gTLD 
program unfolded, which took considerable effort in its institutional preparation. 
Further, it makes visible the underlying competing values and interests that 
various stakeholders bring to the Internet governance discussion. While 
.AMAZON is one of the most prominent controversies about the new gTLD 
program, many other debates are currently being played out, including .HOME, 
.APP, .ART, .BLOG, and .LLC (Holly, 2013). The preliminary findings 
presented in this article may help to inform other controversies related to the 
new gTLD program and CIR more broadly. 
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